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Abstract
We develop a logic of normative ability, as an extension to the Alternating-time Temporal Logic
(ATL) of Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman. While conventional ATL contains cooperation modalities
of the form 〈〈C〉〉ϕ, intended to express the fact that coalition C have the capability to bring about ϕ,
in Normative ATL* (NATL*), these expressions are replaced with constructs of the form 〈〈η : C〉〉ϕ,
with the intended interpretation that C have the ability to achieve ϕ within the context of the nor-
mative system η. A normative system is a set of constraints on the actions that may be performed
in any give state. We show how these normative ability constructs can be used to define obligations
and permissions: ϕ is said to be obligatory within the context of the normative system η if ϕ is a
necessary consequence of every agent in the system behaving according to the conventions of η.
After introducing NATL*, we investigate some of its axiomatic properties. To demonstrate its value
as a logic for reasoning about multi-agent systems, we show how NATL* can be used to formalise a
version of the social contract.
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Over the past decade, there has been steadily increasing interest in the logical founda-
tions of multi-agent systems [17,37–39]. While the literature on this subject encompasses
a wide range of ideas and logical techniques, the Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL)
proposed by Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman appears to be gaining popularity as a key sys-
tem in the area [1]. ATL is a logic of cooperative ability: it is intended to support reasoning
about the powers of agents and coalitions of agents in game-like multi-agent systems. Thus,
for example, in ATL it is possible to express properties of a system such as “the coalition
C1 can guarantee that the system will never enter an invalid state”, and “the coalition C2
can ensure that, eventually, the message will be received”.
From a language point of view, ATL represents an elegant generalisation of the well-
known branching time temporal logic CTL [11], while at the same time containing an
explicit notion of agency, which gives it the flavour of an action logic, in the sense of
dynamic logic and its relatives [14,29]; from a semantic point of view, ATL is based on
models that combine ideas from distributed computing systems and game theory, thus re-
flecting current thinking about the semantics of concurrent computation [27]; and from a
computational point of view, model checking and theorem proving in ATL appear to have
the same complexity as their counterpart problems in CTL [1,10], and in particular, ATL
has a tractable (deterministic polynomial time) model checking problem, for which effi-
cient software tools have been implemented [2].
The fact that ATL bears a close family resemblance to logics of action has prompted
several researchers to investigate this relationship in more detail. One obvious issue is the
link between ATL and deontic logic: the logic of obligation and permission [8,24]. Our
primary aim in this paper is to investigate the relationship between ability and obligations
in detail. More specifically, the paper makes three main contributions to this understanding.
First, we introduce a variant of ATL called Normative ATL* (NATL*).1 The logic NATL*
is based on cooperation modalities of the form 〈〈η : C〉〉ϕ, where η is a normative system,
C is a coalition, and ϕ is a sentence of the logic. The intended interpretation of 〈〈η : C〉〉ϕ
is that operating within the context of the normative system η, coalition C have the ability
to bring about ϕ; more precisely, that C have a winning strategy for ϕ, where this strategy
conforms to the strictures of the normative system η. A normative system in our framework
is a set of rules, which constrain the actions of the agents in the system in certain states.
Given these cooperation modalities, we can recover the cooperation modalities of ATL by
considering ability within the context of the “empty” normative system, i.e., the normative
system η⊥, which places no constraints on the actions of agents other than those imposed
by the system designer.
Second, we introduce an indexed collection of indexed unary modal operators Pη and
Oη, where Pηϕ is intended to mean that ϕ is permissible within the context of the normative
system η, and Oηϕ is intended to mean that ϕ is obligatory within the context of the nor-
mative system η. Perhaps the larger contribution we make here is to show how permission
1 Note that our logic is closer to ATL* than ATL, and hence we feel obliged to use a “*” in the name! We will
sometimes informally refer to “Normative ATL”, and it should be understood that when we do this, we in fact
mean NATL*.
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ability. Crudely, we say that ϕ is obligatory in the context of normative system ϕ if ϕ will
necessarily result if every agent acts according to the norm η. Similarly, ϕ is permissible
in the context of η if there is some way that ϕ can be brought about by a coalition acting
in accordance with the conventions of η.
Third, and finally, we show how NATL* can be used for reasoning about multi-agent
systems, by developing a logical model of the social contract. Crudely, the term “social
contract” refers to the collection of norms or conventions that a society abides by. These
norms serve to regulate and restrict the behaviour of citizens within a society. The benefit
of a social contract is that it prevents mutually destructive behaviours. However, there are
many apparent paradoxes associated with the social contract, not the least being that of
why a rational, self-interested agent should choose to conform to the social contract, when
choosing to do otherwise might lead to a better individual outcome; the problem being that
if everyone reasons this way (and as rational agents, they should), then nobody conforms
to the social contract, and its benefits are lost. There have been several game theoretic
accounts of the social contract, which attempt to understand how a social contract can work
in a society of self-interested agents [6,7,33]; our work can be understood as a preliminary,
tentative attempt to give a logical account. Note that our focus on the social contract is
not prompted by a desire to shed light on issues of political or economic philosophy, but
by a desire to better understand how to engineer societies of self-interested autonomous
software agents [38]; we, along with other researchers [9], believe that the concept of the
social contract is potentially a useful one for understanding and engineering such artificial
societies.
This article is structured as follows. We shortly introduce Action-based Alternating
Transition Systems (AATSs), the structures used to give a semantics to NATL*. In Sec-
tion 3, we introduce our model of normative systems; we discuss the operations that may
be performed on them, as well as the possible relationships that exist between them. In
Section 4, we introduce the logic of Normative ATL itself, and briefly discuss some of its
properties. We define our deontic modalities for NATL* in Section 5, and briefly consider
some of their properties. In Section 6, we show how NATL* may be applied to an under-
standing of the social contract, and we conclude in Sections 7 and 8 with a discussion of
related work and some conclusions.
2. Action-based alternating transition systems
The semantic structures underpinning ATL are known as Action-based Alternating Tran-
sition Systems (AATSs) [34]. We need to be clear about the role that these structures are
intended to play. AATSs are structures for modelling game-like, dynamic, multi-agent sys-
tems. The main characteristics of such systems are that there are multiple agents, each of
which can perform actions in order to modify and attempt to control the system in some
way. Our intention in this paper is that an AATS should be used to model the physical prop-
erties of the system at hand—the actions that agents can perform in the empty normative
system, unfettered by any considerations of their legality or usefulness. However, many
of the systems of interest to us are not “physical world” systems in the obvious sense of
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neutral term “natural”. We also note in passing that, inevitably, when we define an AATS,
this system will represent an abstraction of the “actual” system that we intend to model,
and interpreting an AATS as representing the physical characteristics may therefore not be
entirely appropriate.
We first assume that the systems of interest to us may be in any of a finite set Q of
possible states, with some q0 ∈ Q designated as the initial state. Systems are populated by
a set Ag of agents; a coalition of agents is simply a set C ⊆ Ag, and the set of all agents is
known as the grand coalition. Notice that this is all we mean by the term “coalition” in this
paper: our usage here does not imply any common purpose or shared goal—a coalition in
this paper is simply a set of agents.
Each agent i ∈ Ag is associated with a set Aci of possible actions, and we assume that
these sets of actions are pairwise disjoint (i.e., actions are unique to agents). We denote the
set of actions associated with a coalition C ⊆ Ag by AcC , so AcC =⋃i∈C Aci .
A joint action jC for a coalition C is a tuple 〈α1, . . . , αk〉, where for each αj (where
j  k) there is some i ∈ C such that αj ∈ Aci . Moreover, there are no two different actions
αj and αj ′ in JC that belong to the same Aci . We denote the set of all joint actions for
coalition C by JC , so JC = ∏i∈C Aci . Given an element j of JC and agent i ∈ C, we
denote i’s component of j by ji .
An Action-based Alternating Transition System—hereafter referred to simply as an
AATS—is an (n+ 7)-tuple S = 〈Q,q0,Ag,Ac1, . . . ,Acn,ρ, τ,Φ,π〉, where:
• Q is a finite, non-empty set of states;
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state;
• Ag = {1, . . . , n} is a finite, non-empty set of agents;
• Aci is a finite, non-empty set of actions, for each i ∈ Ag, where Aci ∩Acj = ∅ for all
i 
= j ∈ Ag;
• ρ :AcAg → 2Q is an action precondition function, which for each action α ∈ AcAg
defines the set of states ρ(α) from which α may be executed;
• τ :Q×JAg → Q is a partial system transition function, which defines the state τ(q, j)
that would result by the performance of j from state q—note that, as this function
is partial, not all joint actions are possible in all states (cf. the pre-condition function
above);
• Φ is a finite, non-empty set of atomic propositions; and
• π :Q → 2Φ is an interpretation function, which gives the set of primitive propositions
satisfied in each state: if p ∈ π(q), then this means that the propositional variable p is
satisfied (equivalently, true) in state q .
We require that AATSs satisfy the following two coherence constraints:
(1) Non-triviality [26]. Agents always have at least one action available:
∀q ∈ Q,∀i ∈ Ag,∃α ∈ Aci s.t. q ∈ ρ(α)
400 M. Wooldridge, W. van der Hoek / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 396–420Fig. 1. The train system S1.
(2) Consistency. The ρ and τ functions agree on actions that may be performed:
∀q,∀j ∈ JAg, (q, j) ∈ dom τ iff ∀i ∈ Ag, q ∈ ρ(ji)
We denote the set of sequences over Q by Q∗, and the set of non-empty sequences over Q
by Q+.
Example 1. There are two trains, one of which (E) is Eastbound, the other of which (W ) is
Westbound, each occupying their own circular track. At one point, both tracks pass through
a narrow tunnel—a crash will occur if both trains are in the tunnel at the same time. Unlike
the original versions of this scenario [1], we do not assume that there is a “controller” agent,
whose purpose is to ensure that collisions do not occur. Instead, we will be concerned with
social laws that achieve this end.
We model each train i ∈ Ag = {E,W } as an automaton that can be in one of three
states (see Fig. 1(b)): “awayi” (the initial state of the train); “waitingi” (waiting to enter
the tunnel); and “ini” (the train is in the tunnel). Each train i ∈ {E,W } has two actions
available: Aci = {movei , idlei}. The idlei action is the identity, which causes no change
in the train’s state (i.e., it stays where it is). If a train i executes a movei action while
it is awayi , then it goes to a waitingi state; executing a movei while waitingi causes a
transition to an ini state; and finally, executing a movei while ini causes a transition to
awayi as long as the other train was not in the tunnel, while if both trains are in the tun-
nel, then they have crashed, and are forced to idle indefinitely. Initially, both trains are
away.
The overall state of the system at any given time can be characterised in terms of
the propositional variables {awayE,awayW,waitingE,waitingW, inE, inW }, where these
variables have the obvious interpretation. The overall structure of the train system, and
the model of trains is illustrated in Fig. 1; a formal definition of the train system AATS
is given in Fig. 2 (the function ρ is left implicit, but can be read off from τ : e.g.,
ρ(moveW) = Q \ {q8}, etc.).
Of course, not all combinations of propositional variables correspond to reachable sys-
tem states (i.e., states that the system could possibly enter). For example, an agent i cannot
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Q = {q0, q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6, q7, q8}, initial state q0
Agents, Actions, and Joint Actions:
Ag = {E,W } AcE = {idleE,moveE} AcW = {idleW ,moveW }
JAg = {〈idleE, idleW 〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
j0
, 〈idleE,moveW 〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
j1
, 〈moveE, idleW 〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
j2
, 〈moveE,moveW 〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
j3
}
Propositional Variables:
Φ = {awayE,awayW ,waitingE,waitingW , inE, inW }
Transitions/Pre-conditions/Interpretation:
q\j j0 j1 j2 j3 π(q)
q0 q0 q1 q3 q5 {awayE,awayW }
q1 q1 q2 q5 q6 {awayE,waitingW }
q2 q2 q0 q6 q3 {awayE, inW }
q3 q3 q5 q4 q7 {waitingE,awayW }
q4 q4 q7 q0 q1 {inE,awayW }
q5 q5 q6 q7 q8 {waitingE,waitingW }
q6 q6 q3 q8 q4 {waitingE, inW }
q7 q7 q8 q1 q2 {inE,waitingW }
q8 q8 — — — {inE, inW }
Fig. 2. The AATS for the trains scenario.
be both waitingi and ini simultaneously. There are in fact just nine reachable states of the
system; see Fig. 2.
2.1. Strategies
Given an agent i ∈ Ag and a state q ∈ Q, we denote the options available to i in q—the
actions that i may perform in q—by options(i, q):
options(i, q) = {α | α ∈ Aci and q ∈ ρ(α)}
We then say that a strategy for an agent i ∈ Ag is a function:
σi :Q → Aci
which must satisfy the legality constraint that σi(q) ∈ options(i, q) for all q ∈ Q.
A strategy profile for a coalition C = {a1, . . . , ak} ⊆ Ag is a tuple of strategies
〈σ1, . . . , σk〉, one for each agent ai ∈ C. We denote by ΣC the set of all strategy pro-
files for coalition C ⊆ Ag; if σC ∈ ΣC and i ∈ C, then we denote i’s component of σC
by σ iC . Given a strategy profile σC ∈ ΣC and state q ∈ Q, let out(σC, q) denote the set of
possible states that may result by the members of the coalition C acting as defined by their
components of σC for one step from q:
out(σC, q) =
{
q ′ | τ(q, j) = q ′ where (q, j) ∈ dom τ and σ iC(q) = ji for i ∈ C
}
Notice that, for any grand coalition strategy profile σAg and state q , the set out(σAg, q) will
be a singleton.
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A computation is an infinite sequence of states λ = q0, q1, . . . . A computation λ ∈ Q+
starting in state q is referred to as a q-computation; if u ∈ N, then we denote by λ[u] the
component indexed by u in λ (thus λ[0] denotes the first element, λ[1] the second, and so
on). We denote by λ[0, u] and λ[u,∞] the finite prefix q0, . . . , qu and the infinite suffix
qu, qu+1, . . . of λ respectively.
Given a strategy profile σC for some coalition C, and a state q ∈ Q, we define
comp(σC, q) to be the set of possible runs that may occur if every agent ai ∈ C follows
the corresponding strategy σi , starting when the system is in state q ∈ Q. That is, the set
comp(σC, q) will contain all possible q-computations that the coalition C can “enforce”
by cooperating and following the strategies in σC .
comp(σC, q) =
{
λ | λ[0] = q and ∀u ∈ N: λ[u+ 1] ∈ out(σC,λ[u])}
Again, note that for any state q ∈ Q and any grand coalition strategy σAg, the set
comp(σAg, q) will be a singleton, consisting of exactly one infinite computation.
3. Normative systems
In this section, we introduce our model of normative systems, and briefly investigate
some of its properties. When we use the term “normative system” in this paper, it has a
technical meaning: we are much less concerned with the philosophical issues surrounding
normative systems and their role in human societies—although this will, of course, not
prevent us from borrowing ideas and terminology from the literature of norms, conventions,
and normative systems [20]. For us, a normative system is simply a set of constraints on
the behaviour of agents in a system. More precisely, a normative system defines, for every
possible system state and action, whether or not that action is considered to be legal or not,
in the context of the normative system. Different normative systems, of course, may differ
on whether or not a particular action is considered legal in a particular state.
We model a normative system, η, as a function
η : AcAg → 2Q
with the intended interpretation that q ∈ η(α) means the normative system η forbids action
α from being performed when the system is in state q .
Of course, our normative systems cannot be considered in a vacuum. They are designed
(or emerge [35], though we shall not consider this issue here), in the context of an AATS,
and AATSs have their own notion of legality: whether or not an action is naturally possible,
that is, whether or not it is “physically possible” in the context of the system. It makes no
sense, (in our framework at least), to consider normative systems that permit actions that
are naturally impossible to perform, and so we will place one requirement on normative
systems: that they forbid anything that is forbidden by “nature”. Formally, the requirement
is that:
∀α ∈ AcAg:
(
Q \ ρ(α))⊆ η(α)
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η: if q ∈ ρ(α), then α is naturally possible in q , whereas if q ∈ η(α), then α is forbidden
in q by the normative system η. We denote the set of all normative systems, with respect
to some implicit AATS, by N .
We say a strategy σi ∈ Σi is η-conformant if it never selects an action that is forbidden
by η. We denote the fact that σi conforms to η by conf (σi, η).
conf (σi, η) ⇔ ∀q: q /∈ η
(
σi(q)
)
Given a strategy profile σC ∈ ΣC , we will abuse notation and write conf (σC,η) to indicate
that all the strategies in σC conform to η.
conf (σC,η) ⇔ ∀i ∈ C: conf (σ iC, η)
Finally, we denote the set of all η-conformant strategy profiles for C by ΣηC .
Σ
η
C =ˆ
{
σC ∈ ΣC | conf (σC,η)
}
Example 2. Recall the trains example, given earlier. We will define a normative system η1,
the primary purpose of which is to ensure that the trains never crash, i.e., that the system
never enters state q8. From examination of the state transition function τ (see Fig. 2), we
can see that τ(q5, j3) = τ(q6, j2) = τ(q7, j1) = q8, and there are no other transitions lead-
ing to q8 (apart from when the trains have already crashed, which we need not consider!).
So, consider the normative system η1, as follows.
η1(α) =


∅ if α = idleE
∅ if α = idleW
{q5, q6} if α = moveE
{q7} if α = moveW
This normative system ensures that:
• when both agents are waiting to enter the tunnel, the eastbound train is forbidden to
move;
• when the westbound train is already in the tunnel and the eastbound train is waiting to
enter the tunnel, then the eastbound train is not allowed to move;
• when the eastbound train is already in the tunnel and the westbound train is waiting to
enter the tunnel, then the westbound train is forbidden to move.
Notice that η1 is, in a sense, asymmetric, as it constrains the eastbound train rather than
the westbound train: we could equally well replace the first constraint with the requirement
that if both trains are waiting to enter the tunnel, then the westbound train is prevented from
moving, thus enabling the eastbound train to enter.
3.1. Operations on normative systems
We find it convenient to distinguish two particular normative systems. We denote the
empty normative system by η⊥. This system imposes no constraints on the actions that
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physically/naturally feasible is legal according to η⊥.
∀α ∈ AcAg: η⊥(α) = Q \ ρ(α)
In the trivial normative system η, every action is forbidden in every state.
∀α ∈ AcAg: η(α) = Q
We can develop a kind of calculus of normative systems based on the standard set theoretic
operations of intersection and union, as follows.
η  η′(α) =ˆ η(α)∩ η(α′)
η unionsq η′(α) =ˆ η(α)∪ η(α′)
Notice that the set N of normative systems over some AATS will be closed under these
operators. Having a calculus as sketched would allow one to reason about the composition
of normative systems, similar to the way that one constructs complex programs from sim-
pler ones in Dynamic Logic [14]. However, N would not be closed under difference and
complement operations, which is why we do not consider these.
The laws of these operators are analogous to properties of set theory: for example, η—
the least liberal normative system—serves as the identity under , and η⊥—the most liberal
normative system—serves as the identity under unionsq. We will not exhaustively list these laws,
but simply give the following examples as a flavour.
η unionsq η = η unionsq η⊥ = η and η unionsq η = η
η  η = η  η = η and η  η⊥ = η⊥
3.2. Relationships between normative systems
Let us now consider the possible relationships between normative systems. Of the
relationships that we might consider, we argue that the most obvious—and the most
important—is that of when one normative system is less restrictive than another. Let us
introduce a binary relation  ⊆ N ×N on normative systems, with the intended interpre-
tation that η  η′ means that η is less restrictive (equivalently, more liberal) than η′. (To be
precise, η  η′ will mean that η is “at most as restrictive as” η′, but where no confusion is
possible, we will ignore this distinction in the text.) Formally, we define the relation “”
as follows.
η  η′ ⇔ ∀α ∈ AcAg: η(α) ⊆ η′(α)
Example 3. With respect to the trains system S1, and the normative systems η1 and η2
(where η2 is defined later), we have η1  η2. In other words, η1 is more liberal than η2.
The  relation defines a partial order over N : it is reflexive, transitive, and anti-
symmetric. Moreover, observe that for any normative system η ∈ N , we have η⊥  η and
η  η. Recalling the definitions of  and unionsq from above, we immediately obtain the fol-
lowing.
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be the associated “less restrictive” relation. Then the pair (N,) forms a complete lattice,
with least upper bound η and greatest lower bound η⊥; the meet operation is  and the
join operation is unionsq.
Combining the  relation with the meet and join operations on normative systems, we get
the following properties.
(1)η  η′  η η  η′  η′ η  η unionsq η′ and η′  η unionsq η′
Thus taking the union of two normative systems yields a normative system that is more re-
strictive (less liberal) than either of its parent systems, while taking the intersection of two
normative systems yields a normative system which is less restrictive (more liberal). No-
tice that the unionsq operation is intuitively the act of superposition, or composition of normative
systems: imposing one law on top of another. The unionsq operation thus gives us (the beginnings
of) a calculus through which to understand the composition of normative systems.
The  relation can also be characterised in terms of the strategies available to agents. Let
us call a normative system η to be non-trivial if it allows, everywhere, the grand coalition
Ag to perform an action: η is non-trivial iff
∀q ∈ Q∃j ∈ JAg ∀i ∈ Ag: q /∈ η(ji)
Proposition 2. Let S = 〈Q,q0,Ag,Ac1, . . . ,Acn, ρ, τ,Φ,π〉 be an AATS, and let η and η′
be non-trivial normative systems over S. Then:
η  η′ ⇔ ∀C ⊆ Ag: Ση′C ⊆ ΣηC
Proof. The ⇒ is obvious: If η is less restrictive than η′, then any η′-conformant strategy
profile for C must also be η-conformant. For ⇐, assume for purposes of contradiction that
∀C ⊆ Ag: Ση′C ⊆ ΣηC but η  η′. Since η  η′, then for some agent i ∈ Ag and α ∈ Aci , we
have η(α)  η′(α). Hence for some q ′ ∈ Q, we have:
q ′ ∈ η(α) and q ′ /∈ η′(α)
Now, take any σi from Ση
′
i (since η′ is non-trivial, we know that such a σi exists), and
define a new strategy σ ∗i for i as follows:
σ ∗i (q) =
{
α if q = q ′
σi(q) otherwise
Now by construction, σ ∗i ∈ Ση
′
i , but σ ∗i /∈ Σηi , and so Ση
′
i  Σ
η
i : a contradiction. 
Although the ⇒-direction of Proposition 2 holds for arbitrary systems η and η′, the
other direction does not. Suppose that η′ is such that it forbids every action for every agent
i in a particular state q . Then, for any C, no strategy σC exists that is η′-conformant, so
Σ
η′
C = ∅. Would the ⇒-direction of Proposition 2 be true, then we would have η  η′ for
any η, which obviously need not be the case.
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Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL), can be understood as a generalisation of the
well-known branching time temporal logic CTL [11], in which path quantifiers are replaced
by cooperation modalities. In NATL*, we contextualise cooperation modalities with nor-
mative systems. Thus cooperation modalities in NATL* have the general form 〈〈η : C〉〉ϕ,
which is intended to be read “the coalition C can achieve ϕ, even when it abides by the
rules of normative system η”. More precisely, 〈〈η : C〉〉ϕ means that there is a η-conformant
strategy profile σC for C such that, if the members of C follow their components of σC ,
then ϕ will result. Note that this assumes that, when reasoning about what a coalition C
can bring about within normative system η, we only assume that the agents from C, but
not necessarily the others, will conform to η. Variations on this assumptions are of course
possible and certainly interesting.
The syntax of NATL* closely resembles that of ATL*, the logic that bears the same
relationship to ATL as CTL* does to CTL [1,11,12]. Thus, we make the same distinction
between state formulae and path formulae that is made in branching time temporal logics
such as CTL* [12]. A state formula is interpreted with respect to an individual state within
an AATS, while a path formula is interpreted with respect to a path, or computation, within
an AATS. In the text, when we refer to “a formula of NATL*”, it should be understood that
we mean a state formula. The main difference between ATL* and NATL* is that NATL*
includes normative systems in the object language. The alphabet from which we construct
formulae of NATL*, with respect to AATS S thus contains a set of symbols corresponding
to normative systems over S. For convenience, we will use the same symbol to denote a
normative system in the object language and in the semantics. The formal syntax of NATL*
is given by the BNF grammar in Fig. 3.
We now define the semantics of NATL*. These are given with respect to two satisfac-
tion relations: “|=” (for state formulae), and “||=” (for path formulae). The state formula
satisfaction relation “|=” holds between pairs of the form S,q (where S is an AATS and q
is a state in S), and formulae of NATL*, while the path formula satisfaction relation “||=”
holds between pairs of the form S,λ (where λ is a computation in S):
〈state-fmla〉 ::= true (truth constant)
| p (primitive propositions)
| ¬〈state-fmla〉 (primitive propositions)
| 〈state-fmla〉 ∨ 〈state-fmla〉 (disjunction)
| 〈〈η : C〉〉〈path-fmla〉 (cooperative ability)
〈path-fmla〉 ::= 〈state-fmla〉 (state formulae are path formula)
| ¬〈path-fmla〉 (negation)
| 〈path-fmla〉 ∨ 〈path-fmla〉 (disjunction)
|E〈path-fmla〉 (eventually)
|1〈path-fmla〉 (always)
| 〈path-fmla〉U 〈path-fmla〉 (until)
Fig. 3. The Syntax of NATL*: p ∈ Φ is a propositional variable, η is a symbol denoting a normative system, and
C ⊆ Ag is a set of agents.
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S,q |= p iff p ∈ π(q) (wherep ∈ Φ);
S,q |= ¬ϕ iff S,q  ϕ;
S,q |= ϕ ∨ψ iff S,q |= ϕ or S,q |= ψ ; and
S,q |= 〈〈η : C〉〉ϕ iff ∃σC ∈ ΣηC , such that ∀λ ∈ comp(σC, q), we have S,λ||= ϕ.
The rules defining the path formula satisfaction relation “||=” are as follows.
S,λ||= ϕ iff S,λ[0] |= ϕ (where ϕ is a state formula);
S,λ||= ¬ϕ iff S,λ ;ϕ;
S,λ||= ϕ ∨ψ iff S,λ||= ϕ or S,λ||= ψ ;
S,λ||=!ϕ iff S,λ[1,∞]||= ϕ;
S,λ||=Eϕ iff ∃u ∈ N, we have S,λ[u,∞]||= ϕ;
S,λ||=1ϕ iff ∀u ∈ N we have S,λ[u,∞]||= ϕ; and
S,λ||= ϕUψ iff ∃u ∈ N s.t. S,λ[u,∞]||= ψ , and ∀v s.t. 0 v < u: S,λ[v,∞]||= ϕ.
The remaining classical logic connectives (“∧”, “→”, “↔”) are assumed to be defined as
abbreviations in terms of ¬,∨, in the conventional manner. Note that we use the classical
connectives for both path and state formulae.
We omit set brackets in cooperation modalities for singleton coalitions, writing 〈〈η : 1〉〉
instead of 〈〈η : {1}〉〉. Note that we can recover the cooperation modality of ATL as fol-
lows: 〈〈C〉〉ϕ =ˆ 〈〈η⊥ : C〉〉ϕ. Given these definitions, it is useful to define the universal and
existential path quantifiers of CTL [11].
Aϕ =ˆ 〈〈∅〉〉ϕ Eϕ =ˆ 〈〈Ag〉〉ϕ
Note that these are indeed two extreme cases: Aϕ saying that even if no agents make a
choice, the system will evolve such that ϕ, whereas Eϕ denotes that when all agents make
up their mind and perform an action, the system will evolve such that ϕ. Whereas these are
the only two modalities in CTL, the expressive power of ATL, with 2|Ag| coalitional modali-
ties gives it a real notion of agency, and, indeed, coalition. Here, the latter refers just to any
subset of the grand coalition Ag: ATL does not assume any pre-defined structure between
certain agents, which would qualify them to more likely form a “team” than others.
With 〈〈C〉〉ϕ meaning that “coalition C has a strategy to enforce that, no matter what
the agents not in C will do, ϕ holds”, ATL enables to reason about powers or abilities of
coalitions: one can reason about who can bring it about, in the same way as Dynamic Logic
(with its basic modality [α]ϕ) is meant to reason about how to achieve it [14].
5. Obligations and permissions
Our aim in this section is to show how we can use NATL* to give what we believe is a
natural, compelling, and—we hope—useful interpretation to the deontic notions of oblig-
ation and permission. We define a derived set of indexed unary modal operators Pη and
Oη, where Pηϕ is intended to mean “ϕ is permitted within the context of the normative
system η”, and Oηϕ is intended to mean “ϕ is obligatory in the context of the normative
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interpretation of deontic logic (see [24, p. 6]). In this approach, we give the semantics of
permission and obligation modalities via a standard Kripke semantics, with permission in-
terpreted as a modal diamond, and obligation as a modal box. The deontic accessibility
relation is generally accepted to be serial, yielding the modal system KD. The possible
worlds in the Kripke structures of standard deontic logic are interpreted as “perfect alter-
native worlds”:
The idea behind this formal set-up is that being in some possible world (the current
world) one may associate a set of perfect alternative worlds, in which all norms are
fulfilled. [24, p. 6]
The main distinction between our system and this standard view is that we will consider
deontic notions not relative to some absolute standard of norms, but with respect to a
particular normative system. Thus one cannot simply ask whether ϕ is “obligatory”; one
must ask whether ϕ is obligatory in the context of some normative system. So, how should
one interpret the notion of a world in which “all norms are fulfilled” in the context of a
normative system η? The natural answer to this question is to interpret a perfect world as a
computation of the system in which every agent acts in respect of the normative system η.
So, our definition of obligations and permissions is as follows:
• ϕ is said to be permissible within the context of normative system η iff the grand
coalition of agents can cooperate to achieve ϕ within the context of η—that is, if there
is some way that the grand coalition of all agents can cause ϕ by behaving legally,
according to the normative system η; and
• ϕ is said to be obligatory within the context of normative system η iff ϕ is inevitable
if the grand coalition conforms to η.
This leads immediately to the following definition of permission and obligation.
Pηϕ =ˆ 〈〈η : Ag〉〉ϕ Oηϕ =ˆ¬Pη¬ϕ
Example 4. Recall the trains scenario S1 introduced earlier, and the associated normative
system η1 introduced in Example 2. We have:
S1, q0 |= Oη11¬(inE ∧ inW)
To see this, simply observe that a crash state is not permissible within the context of nor-
mative system η1: if both trains conform to η1, then the trains can never crash. Similarly,
we can capture some permissible properties of η1: in particular, it is permissible for the
trains to progress.
S1, q0 |=
∧
i∈{E,W }
∧
X∈{away,waiting,in}
Pη1EXi
Now, consider normative system η2, which prevents the trains from moving [34].
η2(α) =
{
Q if α = moveE or α = moveW
∅ otherwise
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S1, q0 |= Oη21¬(inE ∧ inW)
But of course, we also have the following—undesirable—side effect.
S1, q0 |= Oη21(awayE ∧ awayW)
Note that only the grand coalition Ag plays a role in our definition of permission Pη , im-
plying that there is space for a much more refined analysis of permissions and obligations
in the coalitional framework of ATL. The most obvious way to do this, for any coalition
C, seems to be to define PC,ηϕ =ˆ〈〈η : C〉〉ϕ, saying that C has a η-conformant strategy to
guarantee ϕ. This does not put any constraint on the agents outside coalition C, they don’t
necessarily need to behave according to η. In the train example, we would for instance have
S1, q0 |= PW,η1EinW ∧ ¬PE,η1EinE (train W does not need social behaviour of E to go
into the tunnel, whereas train E does need W ’s social behaviour!). We would also have
S1, q4 |= ¬PW,η1!(inW ∧ ¬inE) (when both trains are waiting, W cannot, by executing
only socially acceptable strategies, enforce that in the next state he is in the tunnel without
being in a crash situation).
However, we could also define a notion of permission, say pC,η , where pC,ηϕ means
that, if it is given that all agents behave in accordance to η (i.e., both those in C and the
others), C can enforce ϕ. In the trains example we would then have S1, q4 |= pW,η1!(inW ∧¬inE) (if both trains behave according to η1, W is permitted to enter the tunnel safely,
when both are waiting). We leave a thorough investigation addressing these options for
later work, in this paper restricting ourselves to the definition of permissions that refer to
the grand coalition only.
We leave a full axiomatization of NATL* and even NATL for future work, but mention
here some validities. Note that Example 4 deals with NATL-formulas, in which the object of
obligation and permission are temporal. Indeed, these seem natural candidates for specific
study, since it makes little sense to reason about an agent’s deontic status if the world is
not subject to change anymore. Indeed, for any objective formula σ , we have:
(2)|= (σ ↔ Pησ )∧ (σ ↔ Oησ )
This is not to say, of course, that agents do not have responsibilities to change states of
affairs (the following claim is also true for objective formulas):
(3) Oηϕ → Oη1ϕ and  PηEϕ → Oηϕ
From a (modal) logic point of view, Pη can be conceived of as a diamond, and Oη as a
box-like operator. Thus we have:
|= Pη(ϕ ∨ψ) ↔ (Pηϕ ∨ Pηψ) and |= Oη(ϕ ∧ψ) ↔ (Oηϕ ∧ Oηψ)
If something is naturally, or physically inevitable, then it is obligatory in any normative
system; if something is an obligation within a given normative system η, then it is permis-
sible in η; and if something is permissible in a given normative system, then it is naturally
(physically) possible. Thus we have the following chain of implications (where η is an
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|= (Aϕ → Oηϕ) |= (Oηϕ → Pηϕ) |= (Pηϕ → Eϕ)
Note that the second of these properties does not hold for arbitrary normative systems η:
If η = η for example, we have Oηϕ (= ¬Pη¬ϕ) for any ϕ, but at the same time, Pηψ for
no ψ .
Notice that we would not expect physical ability to imply ability within a normative
system, and indeed in NATL*, it does not.
 〈〈C〉〉ϕ → 〈〈η : C〉〉ϕ
If the LHS of this implication were true, then the witness to its truth would be a strategy
profile for C; but this strategy profile would not necessarily be η-conformant.
Moreover, the fact that something is obligatory does not imply that any individual coali-
tion can achieve it, either within or outside the context of a normative system.
 Oηϕ → 〈〈η : C〉〉ϕ and  Oηϕ → 〈〈C〉〉ϕ
Considering the distinguished normative systems η⊥ and η, we get the following.
|= Oη⊥! true
|= Oη! false
If we look at properties with respect to the  relation over normative systems, we obtain:
Proposition 3. Let S be an AATS, and let η,η′ be arbitrary non-trivial normative systems
over S such that η  η′ (i.e., η is less restrictive than η′). Then:
(1) S |= 〈〈η′ : C〉〉ϕ → 〈〈η : C〉〉ϕ
(2) S |= Pη′ϕ → Pηϕ
(3) S |= Oηϕ → Oη′ϕ
Proof. For (1), assume S,q |= 〈〈η′ : C〉〉ϕ. Then ∃σC ∈ Ση
′
C such that ∀λ ∈ out(σC, q),
we have S,λ||= ϕ. But since by Proposition 2, we have that ∀C ⊆ Ag : Ση′C ⊆ ΣηC , then
σC ∈ ΣηC , and hence S,q |= 〈〈η : C〉〉ϕ. Part (2) is the special case of (1) where C is the
grand coalition; part (3) is the contrapositive of (2). 
We combine this result with (1), as follows.
Proposition 4. Let S be an AATS, and let η,η′ be arbitrary non-trivial normative systems
over S. Then:
(1) S |= 〈〈η unionsq η′ : C〉〉ϕ → 〈〈η : C〉〉ϕ
(2) S |= 〈〈η : C〉〉ϕ → 〈〈η  η′ : C〉〉ϕ
(3) S |= Pηunionsqη′ϕ → Pηϕ
(4) S |= Pηϕ → Pηη′ϕ
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(6) S |= Oηηϕ → Oηϕ
Proof. Part (1) follows from Proposition 3 and the fact that η  η unionsq η′. The remaining
cases are identical to these. 
Finally, we briefly look at iterative behaviour of obligations and permissions: it is inter-
esting to note that imposing several norms does not have a cumulative effect
(4) Pη1Pη2ϕ → Pη1ϕ and  Oη1ϕ → Oη1Oη2ϕ
(4) should be clear from the truth definition: when unfolding the definition for 〈〈η1 : Ag〉〉
〈〈η2 : Ag〉〉ϕ for instance, the, the search for η1-conformant strategies is completely ‘over-
ruled’ by a search for strategies that are η2-conformant. This even holds when we insert
a number of temporal operators, i.e., we also have  Oη1ϕ → Oη1!Oη2ϕ. If one wants to
impose a normative system η2 on top of another η1, the union operator unionsq seems to be the
most appropriate way to do it.
6. Multi-agent systems, social laws, and social contracts
In this section, we demonstrate how the apparatus of NATL* may be used to analyse the
properties of multi-agent systems. We present a formal analysis of the social contract, a
well-known concept from political and economic philosophy. The idea of the social con-
tract is generally attributed in its original form to Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and his
concept of a society as a “Leviathan”, with substantial subsequent refinements and contri-
butions to the theory by John Locke (1632–1704), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778),
and most notably in the present era, John Rawls. The term “social contract” is usually
understood as referring to the set of rules, norms, or conventions that a society implicitly
accepts in order to coordinate and manage its behaviour. Ken Binmore, a game theorist and
recent commentator on the social contract [6,7], understands the term as follows:
We are all players in the game of life, with divergent aims and aspirations that make
conflict inevitable. In a healthy society, a balance between these differing aims and aspi-
rations is achieved so that the benefits of cooperation are not entirely lost in internecine
strife. Game theorists call such a balance an equilibrium. Sustaining such equilibria re-
quires the existence of commonly understood conventions about how behaviour is to be
coordinated. It is such a system of coordinating conventions that I shall identify with a
social contract. [5, p. 6]
Notice that the term social contract does not only refer to the formalised laws that a society
imposes upon itself, but also to the informally accepted norms and conventions that are
part and parcel of everyday life.
Understanding how a social contract works is of great interest to political philosophers
and economists. Apart from anything else, much of the function of government can be
understood as attempting to engineer a society’s social contract. And yet there are many
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should comply with such a contract. A rational agent, seeking to maximise its own welfare,
may well observe that the best outcome would be if it chose to ignore the rules, while
allowing other agents to conform to them; and yet if every agent reasons the same way, then
everyone ignores the social contract, and its benefits are lost. A game theoretic analysis of
such a scenario leads to a model resembling the well known “prisoner’s dilemma” scenario
(or perhaps more accurately, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma), which accounts in no small
measure for the interest this scenario has attracted [3,6,7].
In this section, we will use NATL*, our logic of normative ability, to formalise a model
of the social contract, and begin a preliminary analysis of its properties. To do this, we will
work with three different types of structure, as follows:
A Multi-Agent System consists of an AATS (which specifies the underlying behaviour
of the system, and the effect that agent’s actions have on the system), together with a set
of goals, one for each agent. Thus a multi-agent system determines what agents want to
achieve (their aspirations), and the fundamental—physical or natural—rules within which
they must operate.
A Social Law is a structure that is developed and manipulated by the overseer, designer,
or manager of a system. Following [34], we define a social law to consist of a normative
system (i.e., a set of rules) together with some objective, or goal. The idea is that the de-
signer, overseer, or manager of the system will develop the normative system so that, if the
norms are followed, then the objective will be achieved (in which case we say the norma-
tive system is globally effective). If one thinks about the social contract in the conventional
sense, then we can think of the “designer” as the politician, who is trying to modify or
replace an existing social contract. The designer will try to construct a set of rules so that,
if they are followed, the objective will inevitably follow. Of course, the designer cannot
ignore the agents within the system, which will typically be self-interested, with their own
goals and objectives to achieve.
A Social Contract consists of a multi-agent system together with a social law. That is, a
social contract defines (i) the natural or physical properties of a system; (ii) the aspirations
of the agents within the system; (iii) a set of normative rules, in addition to those inherent
within the physical structure of the system, which are intended to restrict the behaviour
of the agents in the system in certain desirable ways; and (iv) a system-level objective, or
goal, which it is hoped will be achieved if the agents within the system conform to the
normative rules.
The main relationships between the concepts in our structures are described by the
entity-relationship diagram in Fig. 4. In what follows, we will formalise each type of struc-
ture, give examples to illustrate them, and investigate some of their properties. Note that,
throughout this section, when we refer to a normative system, it should be understood that
we mean a non-trivial normative system.
A multi-agent systemM is an (n+ 1)-tuple:M= 〈S,γ1, . . . , γn〉 where:
• S = 〈Q,q0,Ag,Ac1, . . . ,Acn, ρ, τ,Φ,π〉 is an AATS, intended to represent the physi-
cal properties of the system in question; and
• for all i ∈ Ag, γi is a path formula of NATL*, intended to represent the goal of agent i.
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Example 5. In the trains scenario, consider the following goals for the two agents:
γE =1EinE γW =1EinW
That is, the goal of each train is to enter the tunnel infinitely often. (In the terminology of
the reactive systems literature, these are liveness properties [11,22].)
Following [34], we take a teleological view of social laws. That is, we consider social
laws with respect to the goal, or objective that they are intended to achieve. Formally, we
define a social law over an AATS S to be a pair: L= 〈Ψ,η〉 where:
• Ψ is a path formula of ATL representing the objective of the law; and
• η : AcAg → 2Q is a normative system over S.
We say a social law 〈Ψ,η〉 (over a MAS M= 〈S,γ1, . . . , γn〉) is:
globally effective if S,q0 |= OηΨ ;
weakly globally effective if S,q0 |= PηΨ ; and
globally ineffective if S,q0 |= Oη¬Ψ
Example 6. In the trains system, perhaps the main goal of a designer will be to prevent
negative interactions between agents, and in particular, to prevent the trains from crashing
in the tunnel. We denote this objective as Ψ1:
Ψ1 =1¬(inE ∧ inW)
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〈Ψ1, η1〉 〈Ψ1, η2〉
Thus, if the designer of the system is only concerned about preventing the trains from
crashing, then either η1 or η2 would appear to be satisfactory.
Of course, the designer of a normative system will not only be concerned about whether
it will be globally effective, i.e., whether or not it would “succeed” if everyone adhered to
the constraints it imposed. The designer must also consider whether or not these constraints
will be adhered to. This question cannot be answered without reference to the goals that
agents have. This motivates the introduction of the next structure: a social contract.
Formally, we model a social contract Ω as a pair: Ω = 〈M,L〉 where:
• M= 〈S,γ1, . . . , γn〉 is a multi-agent system; and
• L= 〈Ψ,η〉 is a social law over S.
Now, the basic question we ask of a social contract is whether or not it is successful. The
overall success of a social contract hinges on two distinct issues. The first, and in some
sense easier, issue is that of whether the social law component L = 〈Ψ,η〉 is globally
effective, as defined above. Thus, this means asking whether or not it is the case that, if
every agent in the system adhered to the normative system η, the corresponding objective
Ψ would be achieved.
However, there is a second issue in determining whether a social contract is successful,
which is arguably more troublesome. We must determine whether or not the agents in the
system will actually conform to the rules of the normative system η. We assume agents are
autonomous (we cannot impose decisions upon them), and self-interested (they will choose
to perform a particular action if they believe it is in their best interests, and not otherwise).
So, let us say that a social contract is
locally effective for agent i if S,q0 |= Oηγi;
partially locally effective for agent i if S,q0 |= 〈〈η : i〉〉γi;
weakly locally effective for agent i if S,q0 |= Pηγi; and
locally ineffective for agent i if S,q0 |= Oη¬γi
We will say a social contract is simply “locally effective” if it is locally effective for all
agents in the system, and similarly for weakly locally effective and locally ineffective.
Example 7. Let us return to the train system S1: consider the system with goals γE and
γW , as defined earlier, and normative system η3 defined as follows.
η3(α) =


Q if α = idleE
Q \ {q0} if α = idleW
∅ if α = moveE
{q0} if α = moveW
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ing the westbound train to stay still, and thereafter prevents either train from idling: they
move in lock-step. It is not hard to see that, thus defined, the trains do not crash (and
hence 〈Ψ1, η3〉 is a globally effective social law), and moreover, the trains are in the tunnel
infinitely often, hence η3 is locally effective.
The disadvantage of the normative system η3 is that it completely constrains the actions
of the trains. That is, neither train has any choice about what to do: they only ever have
one action available to them. Thus this normative system would not be effective if the
trains were ever to desire to stop (e.g., to pick up passengers!) So, consider the following
normative system, which works by forbidding trains from lingering in the tunnel, but is
otherwise the same as η1.
η4(α) =


{q4, q7} if α = idleE
{q2, q6} if α = idleW
{q5, q6} if α = moveE
{q7} if α = moveW
Moreover, let us weaken the goals of the agents somewhat.
γ ′E =1Pη4EinE, γ ′W =1Pη4EinW
The idea is that the agent’s goals are not necessarily to enter the tunnel infinitely often, but
that it is permissible for them to enter the tunnel infinitely often.
Then we have:
S,q0 |= Oη4Ψ1 & S,q0 |= Oη4γ ′E & S,q0 |= Oη4γ ′W
In sum, considering the social contract
Ω ′ = 〈〈S1, γ ′E,γ ′W 〉, 〈Ψ1, η4〉〉
we see that Ω ′ is both globally and locally effective. It is globally effective because the
objective Ψ1 is obligatory in the context of η4, and it is locally effective because the goals
γ ′E and γ ′W of the two agents are obligatory in the context of η4.
For completeness, let us see how some of the other social contracts that arise from our
discussion stack up. Consider:
Ω1 =
〈〈S1, γE, γW 〉, 〈Ψ1, η1〉〉
Ω2 =
〈〈S1, γE, γW 〉, 〈Ψ1, η2〉〉
Ω3 =
〈〈S1, γE, γW 〉, 〈Ψ1, η3〉〉
The social contracts Ω1 and Ω2 are globally effective but not locally effective, while
Ω3 is both globally and locally effective.
Given the preceding discussion, Table 1 summarises the possible types of social con-
tracts, with respect to their properties at the social law level (are they effective?) and the
individual agents in the system (will they help or hinder agents in achieving their goals?).
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Social contract types
Objective
status
Agent
status
Comment Globally
effective?
Locally
effective?
1. OηΨ
∧
i∈Ag Oηγi strongest yes yes
2. OηΨ
∧
i∈Ag 〈〈η : i〉〉γi yes partially
3. OηΨ
∧
i∈Ag Pηγi yes weakly
4. OηΨ
∨
i∈Ag Oη¬γi yes no
5. OηΨ
∧
i∈Ag Oη¬γi yes no!
6. PηΨ
∧
i∈Ag Oηγi weakly yes
7. PηΨ
∧
i∈Ag 〈〈η : i〉〉γi weakly partially
8. PηΨ
∧
i∈Ag Pηγi weakly weakly
9. PηΨ
∨
i∈Ag Oη¬γi weakly no
10. PηΨ
∧
i∈Ag Oη¬γi weakly no!
11. Oη¬Ψ ∧i∈Ag Oηγi ineffective yes
12. Oη¬Ψ ∧i∈Ag 〈〈η : i〉〉γi ineffective partially
13. Oη¬Ψ ∧i∈Ag Pηγi ineffective weakly
14. Oη¬Ψ ∨i∈Ag Oη¬γi ineffective no
15. Oη¬Ψ ∧i∈Ag Oη¬γi weakest ineffective no!
• Social contracts of type (11)–(15) will be unacceptable to the designers of a system,
since these contracts ensure that the global objective will not be achieved. Of the
remaining social contract types, (1)–(5) will be preferred over (6)–(10), since these
guarantee the achievement of the global objective.
• Social contracts of types (5), (10), and (15) will be unacceptable to all agents within
the system (the “population”), since such social contracts will prevent their goals being
achieved.
• Social contracts of types (4), (9), and (14) will disenfranchise some agents within the
system, by preventing them from achieving their goals. It is hard to see why these
agents would accept such a social contract, since by definition to do so would prevent
them from achieving their goals. One might comment that social contract types (4) and
(9) reflect the situation in “underclass” communities, where society requires members
of such a disadvantaged community to respect the laws of the society, while at the
same time effectively preventing them from advancement if they do respect the laws
of the society.
Since a social contract designer would reject social contract types (11)–(15), and agents
within the system would reject types (5), (10), and probably (4) and (9) also, this leaves us
with types (1)–(3) and (6)–(8) as potentially successful social contract types. Given that the
designer would prefer all of (1)–(3) over all of (6)–(8), and an agent would prefer (1)–(2)
over (3), it seems that the most viable social contracts are those of types (1) or (2).
Clearly, the “strongest” type of social contract is type (1). Here, every agent will benefit
from conforming to the contract (if everyone conforms to the social contract, then everyone
will have their goals achieved), while society also benefits (if everyone conforms to the
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point of view, there is perhaps not too much to distinguish type (1) and (2), except the
guarantee of success in (1).
Clearly, there is much more that can be done with respect to the analysis of social
contracts and how they work than we have attempted to do here. For example, the issue of
how a society deals with violation of a social contract by an agent is not addressed. One
might therefore consider modelling sanctions within the formal framework. Similarly, one
might try to develop a more fine-grained model of preferences and utilities than the simple
logical specification of goals that we have adopted here.
7. Related work
With respect to the models and intuitions underpinning our framework, the closest
approach in the literature to ours is the social laws framework of Moses, Shoham, and
Tennenholtz. Shoham and Tennenholtz were the first to precisely articulate the notion of
social laws for multiagent systems, and set up a basic formal framework within which
computational questions about social laws could be formulated [30–32]. The particular
application domain was that of traffic laws for robotic agents. The basic framework was
extended by Fitoussi and Tennenholtz, to consider simple social laws—essentially, social
laws that could not be any simpler without failing [13].
Moses and Tennenholtz developed a deontic epistemic logic for representing proper-
ties of multiagent systems with normative structures [26]. Although semantically similar
to NATL* (and ATEL [16]), their logic was quite different to ATL in terms of the syntac-
tic constructs it provided, and the emphasis was primarily on deriving axioms capturing
static aspects of artificial social systems and social laws. The logic did contain notions of
“socially reachable” states of affairs, which roughly corresponds to our normative ability
operators, the normative system was fixed in the semantics of the logic—normative sys-
tems were not first-class components of the language. Nevertheless, much of the intuition
underpinning this logic is similar to our own, and this system was, apart from ATL, the
largest single inspiration for the present paper.
Deontic logic originally arose in the context of formal philosophy, but has recently
found increasing application in computer science and multi-agent systems research [36].
Deontic logic is usually formulated as a normal modal logic with Kripke semantics, con-
taining unary modal operators O and P, where Oϕ is intended to be read as “ϕ is obligatory”
and Pϕ as “ϕ is permissible”. Although there is broad agreement that the modal system KD
serves as a “standard” deontic logic, there are many “paradoxes” that arise when a naive
modal approach to reasoning about deontic notions is adopted, and much of the deontic
logic literature is concerned both with trying to understand whether these apparent para-
doxes really are problematic, and if so, how they can be fixed.
A prominent discussion in deontic logic concerns “contrary-to-duty’ (CTD) obligations,
in which there is a “primary” obligation together with a “secondary” one, which comes
into effect when the first obligation is violated. Prakken and Sergot [28] convincingly argue
that many of the paradoxes with CTD can be solved by adding a temporal component to
the language. This would make NATL also an appropriate framework to at least deal with
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the applicability of NATL* is even broader here, since in NATL* we can explicitly refer to
different norms. A standard example of a CTD obligation (from [28]) is obtained by the
following triple: (i) there must be no fence; (ii) if there is a fence, it must be a white fence;
and (iii) there is a fence. It might be well possible, in NATL, to model (i) as an obligation
with respect to a system η1, whereas (ii) then is an obligation with respect to a “fall-back”
normative system η2, which gives a recipe for the available choices if the agents cannot be
obedient to the “default” system η1.
A preliminary investigation of the relationship between ATL and deontic logic was pre-
sented in [19]: this work took the obvious route of enriching ATL directly with deontic
accessibility relations and modalities, and tentatively exploring the space of possible sys-
tems that result.
The work in this paper can perhaps be understood as developing a computationally
grounded semantics for obligation, and in this sense, we are following Lomuscio and Ser-
got with their development of deontic interpreted systems [21]. The basic idea in their
logic was to interpret the deontic accessibility relation as linking states where the system
is correctly functioning: thus q |= Oϕ in their system if ϕ is true in all states q ′ that can be
reached from state q such that the system is correctly functioning in q ′. Lomuscio and Ser-
got gave an axiomatization of their logic, and also investigated the epistemic properties of
their system—in particular, what a “correctly functioning” agent would know. Although,
as we noted above, epistemic extensions to ATL have been developed [16], and Moses and
Tennenholtz made use of such notions in their logic of artificial social systems, we are not
aware of any attempt to analyse the knowledge implicit in normative systems, and it may
be that some combination of Lomuscio and Sergot’s approach with our own would yield
some insights in this direction.
We should also make mention of Meyer’s reduction of deontic logic to dynamic logic
[23]. Meyer’s insight was to see how an account of obligation could be given in dynamic
logic by introducing a primitive proposition V , whose satisfaction in some state q would
indicate that a violation of the normative system had occurred. We could then say that
an action α was forbidden if that action lead to the V being satisfied. Building on this
notion of “forbidden”, Meyer went on to show how obligation and permission could be
defined. Some articles examining the relationship between deontic logic and action logic,
in a similar vein to that of Meyer, were presented in [25].
The abilities in ATL refer to “physical” abilities of agents, and are identified with
choices; this is similar, but not the same as the notion of “responsibilities” that is ascribed
to agents in the so-called STIT (Seeing To It That) theory [4]. The exact relation between
ATL abilities and STIT responsibilities is an interesting issue, and deserves further analy-
ses. This is a prerequisite to be able to compare NATL* with STIT plus obligations [18].
Although the two frameworks look semantically rather similar, there are notable difference
in validities (in STIT for instance, one has that if it is obligatory that i sees to it that ϕ, then
if follows that ϕ is obligatory).
Finally, we should mention our own work on social laws, which introduced the AATS
structures, and investigated issues of feasibility and effectiveness of social laws in this set-
ting [34]. The main difference is that in the present paper, we attempt to bring the reasoning
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social laws at the meta-language level.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a logic of normative ability, as an extension to ATL,
the logic of cooperative ability developed by Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman. We have
demonstrated how this logic can be used for defining deontic notions such as obligation
and permission, illustrated these ideas with a running example, and applied the logic to a
preliminary formal analysis of the social contract.
There are many possible routes for future investigation. One obvious question is the
extent to which other notions such as knowledge can be incorporated into the framework
[15,16]. Another question is the computational properties (model checking, satisfiability)
of NATL*: syntactically, NATL* is closer to the “full” branching time logic CTL* than its
computationally better behaved cousin CTL, and hence model checking and satisfiability
are likely to be complex for NATL*. However, restricted forms of NATL* may well have
more desirable computational properties, and so the extent to which such restrictions might
be usable in practice is surely worth studying.
Finally, the twin issues of violation and sanction are also surely worth investigating, and
a refinement of the social contract types in Table 1 would be a first step in this direction.
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